Why, When, and How Do Weaker States Hedge? Explaining Southeast Asia’s Responses to China’s Rise
Tuesday, March 31, 201512:00 PM - 1:30 PM (Pacific)
Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall 3rd Floor Central
616 Serra Street,
Stanford, CA 94305
Increasingly in scholarly descriptions of state responses to power ascendancy, the classic distinction between “balancing” and “bandwagoning” has been superseded by the less dichotomous term “hedging” as a name for what is really going on. Few, however, have tried to clarify what distinguishes hedging from other strategies, what causes weaker states to hedge, and why they hedge in different ways.
Prof. Kuik will focus on Southeast Asian states’ responses to China. Hedging occurs, he will argue, when one country pursues contradictory policies toward two or more competing powers in order to prepare a fallback position should circumstances change. Hedging is likely when two conditions are present: when threats are neither immediate nor straightforward, and when sources of vital support are uncertain. At the domestic level, hedging is often the most viable approach because its contradictory attributes allow ruling elites to optimize multiple policy tradeoffs and thereby to enhance their legitimacy at home. The hedging behaviors of ruling elites are a function of their respective strategies of legitimation.