Japan’s Evolving Defense Policy and U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation

Expectations versus Reality

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Japan’s Evolving Defense Policy and U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation: *Expectations versus Reality*

U.S.-Asia Security Initiative
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Stanford University

and

Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

*in conjunction with*

The Japan Center for International Exchange

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COVER PHOTO: The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer JS *Takanami* (DD 110), front, sails alongside the guided-missile destroyer USS *McCampbell* (DDG 85) during a March 2014 tactical training event between the two ships.

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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 American and Japanese Perspectives on the Security Trends in Asia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 The Impact of the New Security Policy on U.S.-Japan Security</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation Efforts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Defense Cooperation and Weapons Development &amp; Acquisition</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Conclusions—Facing the Policy and Operational Challenges Head-On</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshop Agenda in Context</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Takamizawa Nobushige, Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, delivers the lunchtime keynote address at the Inaugural U.S.-Japan Security Workshop in Tokyo on May 19, 2016. 

Credit: Elena Cryst
In the fall of 2015, the Japanese parliament enacted a historic revision of the country’s national security legislation, allowing Japan to exercise for the first time the right to collective self-defense. The sweeping changes in Japan’s defense role were based on an earlier cabinet decision to reinterpret the restrictions on its use of force beyond instituting strictly self-defense measures, as imposed by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Together, these changes embody the most significant shift in Japan’s defense policy since the end of World War II. With the enactment of the new legislation in the spring of 2016, Japanese military forces could potentially be employed to assist the United States and other partners in operations in areas well beyond the bounds of the defense of Japan’s own territory.

In addition, the recent changes in Japan’s security policy potentially transform the nature of the security alliance between Japan and the United States, forged in the aftermath of the war. “The quality of the Japan-U.S. alliance has reached a point where we can defend each other from now on,” Prime Minister Abe Shinzo told the Japanese Upper House of the Parliament. “Our ties have become much stronger.” However, these changes are also highly controversial within Japan, with many Japanese expressing fears that the country may now be drawn into conflicts, even wars, beyond its borders. As a result, the implementation of this historic shift remains limited by political constraints and will unfold slowly. For American security officials, higher expectations about what Japan can now do needs to be tempered by a deeper understanding of the realities of what Japan can deliver in practice.

At the same time, there are rising tensions in East Asia, fed by China’s assertion of its power and by uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula. All of this underscores the growing need for expanded security cooperation, based on a frank and deepening dialogue about where the alliance is headed.

On May 19, 2016, the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI) of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University, working in cooperation with the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), convened a unique gathering in Tokyo to discuss these issues. The workshop, entitled “Japan’s Evolving Defense Policy and U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation: Expectations versus Reality,” assembled a distinguished group of American and Japanese security specialists from the academic community and the media, as well as current and recently retired officials from the Government of Japan, Japan Self-Defense Forces, the Government of the United States, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Forces Japan.
To encourage frank dialogue, the workshop was convened on a closed-door basis, with the discussion summarized in this report without attribution to individual participants. The workshop was organized into three sessions, beginning with a discussion of the regional security environment and moving on to examine in detail the implications of the changes in Japan's security legislation. The conversation, while in depth, also covered a wide array of policy measures ranging from joint operations planning to defense technology development. The goal was to encourage a candid exchange of views, to get beyond the platitudes of alliance cooperation, and to identify challenges for cooperation and gaps in understanding between American and Japanese policy researchers and practitioners. At the beginning of each session of the workshop, American and Japanese experts were paired to provide opening presentations to spark discussions. The organizers hope that this workshop will be the basis for an ongoing security dialogue that advances the analysis of salient issues in an increasingly dynamic alliance.

The opening session focused on what participants agreed were the two key security challenges in the region: the rapid expansion of Chinese military capability and its assertion to gain regional predominance, particularly in the East and South China Seas; and the danger of conflict on the Korean Peninsula due to North Korea’s unchecked pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. Beyond that broad agreement, however, participants acknowledged a lack of clear policy consensus on how to respond to either of these security threats, which are distinct in nature and where priorities of the two allies may not be entirely aligned. In their assessments, both the United States and Japan combine elements of engagement and hedging toward China, participants noted, and there is a lack of clarity about the response to so-called gray zone threats that are inherently ambiguous in nature. Regarding Korea, participants also focused on the need for more concrete steps in trilateral security cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK).

The second session focused on the recent changes in Japan’s defense legislation, the reinterpretation of Article 9 of Japan’s post-World War II Constitution with regard to collective defense, and the implications of these changes for the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The creation of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) based on the recently developed joint defense guidelines was received as a welcome update. But there was also frank discussion of the lag between policy and the expansion of military capacity, and the revision of doctrine and structures associated with joint operations, training, and war planning. Achieving true interoperability remains a challenge for the military forces and defense planners on both sides of the alliance, participants agreed. The dialogue also emphasized the need for broader partnership with regional allies and friends, including the ROK, Australia, the Philippines, India, and others. Dialogue centered on ways to alter and upgrade such partnerships to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of combined operations.

The third session considered the direct impact of the recent changes in Japan’s defense legislation on security cooperation, and particularly on weapons development and procurement programs. Japan has moved to reform its weapons development, logistics and technology policies, including defense exports. But these remain at an early stage and setbacks, such as Australia’s decision not to procure Japanese submarines, suggest that the process of change will be slow. Still, there is great potential for U.S.-Japan cooperation, not only in defense technology development, but also in the creation of joint marketing of defense equipment. The dialogue acknowledged the reality that Japan’s defense capacities remain limited in many realms.

The workshop moved into very concrete policy areas, though the participants did not reach consensus on overall recommendations. The main conclusion was that there was a need for a continuing dialogue on these issues that involves both non-governmental and government experts, including uniformed personnel.
from both countries. The creation of an ongoing network for candid discussion was a clear goal coming out of this workshop.

The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative hopes to establish this dialogue between the United States and Japan as an annual event. A summary of the conference discourse is published here with the goal of contributing to ongoing research and discussions on the critical issues currently impacting the U.S.-Japan security alliance and the implications of these challenges for their partnership, for their allies and partners, and for the enduring peace and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Japanese participation in the workshop relied heavily on the cooperation of the Japan Center for International Exchange, led by Professor Sahashi Ryo.

The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative is a security policy research program established under the auspices of Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University and its parent organization, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). The Initiative facilitates interdisciplinary, policy-relevant research on security and international cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and seeks to offer practical steps for stakeholders seeking to strengthen regional cooperation and security.
Lt. Thomas Brewer, (right), Chief Engineer of Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85), and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Lt. Cdr. Hironori Ikeda, of JMSDF Chief staff, Escort Division 6, discuss tactical data from the Combat Information Center (CiC) during Multi Sail 2016.

Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Bryan Jackson/Flickr user U.S. Pacific Fleet, under a Creative Commons license
From the outset, there was consensus among conference participants that the increasing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the growing nuclear weapons program of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) present the most significant threats both to the strategic security interests of the United States and Japan and to the peace and stability of the entire Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Yet the challenges posed by China and North Korea respectively were seen as quite distinct, leaving participants with differing perspectives on how best to define and prioritize the issues currently confronting the United States, Japan, and the revision of the guidelines informing conduct within their decades-old security partnership.

The dilemmas posed by China are numerous. Varying in type, intensity, and urgency, these challenges affect an array of sectors, ranging from the security to the political and the economic and beyond. By contrast, the concerns emanating from North Korea’s unpredictable provocations are far less diffuse, falling primarily in the realm of the military, including a growing cybersecurity threat. Participants felt that the stakes in managing provocations from the PRC and DPRK are high, as the mismanagement of a crisis caused by either or both of these states could lead to an array of catastrophic outcomes ranging from nuclear strikes on the United States, Japan, or South Korea, to the outbreak of a regional conflict that even if limited in nature could have significant repercussions not just for the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, but also globally.

The growing number and intensity of security challenges emanating from China and North Korea present the most pressing issues confronting the U.S.-Japan security alliance at this time. Workshop attendees identified several specific issue areas where they felt that more effective, better-coordinated, combined responses by the United States and Japan would be required and where the continued mutual
support of their regional and global allies and partners will become essential in the future.

**China's increasingly aggressive behavior**

Over the past three decades, the People's Republic of China has enjoyed astounding economic development and growth as well as a dramatic increase in the size and capabilities of its military. Along with its rise in wealth and influence, China’s assertive quest to expand its influence and control over the South China Sea and East China Sea has raised concerns in the United States and Japan, as well as among their allies and partners both regionally and globally.

However, China’s strategy has not involved military operations to seize control of disputed land or maritime passages. Instead, the PRC’s reach has (for the most part) expanded incrementally, leaving the United States and Japan with few options for effectively countering or even deterring China’s actions. To date, neither the United States nor Japan has been able to successfully dissuade China from pursuing its goal of extending its authority over an increasing expanse of maritime areas in the Western Pacific.

Conference participants felt strongly that the United States and Japan both needed to do more—individually and together—to secure future prospects for long-term stability in the region. In particular, participants suggested that both countries urgently need to work closely on revamping, from top to bottom, alliance defense policies as well as the coordination and implementation mechanisms, in order to more effectively counter China’s growing military capabilities and, more importantly, its apparent willingness to use that power to assert its control over areas regardless of how Japan, the United States, or any of the regional actors react.

**China's growing military capabilities**

The extraordinary growth rate of the PRC economy since the mid-1980s spurred a desire to expand its military capabilities and reach. Ironically, as China’s economy currently shows signs of significant slowing, the leadership has made increasing PRC military capabilities a top priority. Workshop participants felt that this objective is being pursued, in part, to increase nationalist sentiments within China as a means of offsetting the negative effects that their less dynamic economy is having on the quality of life.

In its push to augment its military, China has focused efforts on creating a blue water navy capable of challenging America’s naval forces, especially in the South China Sea. The PRC also seeks to diversify and improve its land- and sea-based missile capabilities, including its nuclear arsenal. In addition, the PRC has created a fleet of heavily armed “coast guard” ships with ramming capabilities that they use to confront states who seek to challenge China’s control over the disputed islands, rocks, land features, sea lanes, and economic zones.

For the United States and Japan, China’s willingness to flex its military power to assert territorial and maritime claims is disturbing, no matter what the underlying motivations might be. Even more worrisome is China’s intentional disregard for the measured responses of the United States, Japan, and other concerned countries in the region. In its dispute with the Philippines over land features and sea lanes, China has declared that it fully intends to disregard any decision handed down by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).

**Maritime and territorial disputes in the South China and East China Seas**

Maritime security encompasses a wide array of critical issues that affect nations in Asia and around the world. In the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS), China is now actively challenging the United States, Japan, and their regional and global allies and partners for access to and control over sea lines of communication (SLOC, which includes both naval and

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1 Subsequent to the workshop, on July 12, 2016, the PCA announced its findings on this issue, which were adverse to the PRC position. The Chinese government immediately rejected these findings.
commercial applications), sea-based resources (including rights to sea food, minerals, oil, and other essential resources found in the sea itself, in the sea floor, or above the sea surface), and environmentally sensitive tracts and passages that house rocks, islands, land features, and resources in geostrategically significant locations.

China’s aggressive attempts at expanding geographic control have come in the form of targeted island-building and declarations of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) over areas previously shared by numerous other sovereign entities. PRC actions are already directly impacting not only the United States and Japan, but also their allies and partner states in Asia. Conference participants felt that without a way to effectively stop China’s aggressive expansion, the maritime and territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea will ultimately result either in a conflict involving the United States and several of the regional states, or with China eventually seizing control over the SCS and ECS without firing a shot. China is currently embroiled in maritime and/or territorial island disputes with Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia (and also with Taiwan over the question of national sovereignty and identity).

Participants agreed that these maritime and territorial island disputes are more likely to be peacefully resolved through effective bilateral and multilateral efforts on the part of Japan, the United States, and their regional and global allies and partners. Historically, the United States and Japan have both responded to China’s maritime and territorial incursions by concentrating their efforts on strengthening their strategic reach through enhanced diplomatic, economic, political, and security partnerships, and by reinforcing existing regional coalitions and agreements. Conference participants acknowledged that China’s decision to actively pursue its ambitions to extend its influence over the South and East China Seas has made nations throughout Asia much more receptive to such overtures by both the American and Japanese governments. They point to the recent policy shift by the Obama Administration to lift the government ban on arms sales to Vietnam as well as the U.S. agreement with the Filipino government to allow the U.S. military to build military facilities at five bases in the Philippine Islands as examples of the growing willingness of regional actors to work more closely with the United States and its allies.

Over the past year, in an attempt to enforce transit and other passage rights through some of the disputed areas in the South China Sea, the United States has begun to expand its freedom of navigation and overflight operations. In addition, in 2014 President Obama clearly stated that, under the provisions of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, the United States will actively defend Japan should the PRC launch an unprovoked attack against Japan’s civilian or military personnel on Japanese-administered territory in the disputed areas of the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands.

For its part, Japan’s recent changes to defense legislation has opened the door for it to consider ways that will eventually enable Japan’s armed forces to more actively participate in combined logistical support and even combat operations that are not restricted to the direct defense of the nation. However, since these changes are so recent, participants agreed that future U.S.-Japan operational strategies and plans that rely on the alliance will need to be redeveloped jointly from the ground up. The consensus among participants was that Japan and the United States should focus on rapidly developing effective joint strategies and plans for the defense of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and the Ryukyu Islands, both of which have been the target of Chinese territorial claims.

**China and gray zone activities**

Over the past two decades, the People’s Republic of China has systematically modern-
ized its armed forces, augmenting its offensive capabilities in an effort to further its foreign policy aims and specifically to enforce its sovereignty claims in the Western Pacific. However, workshop participants have noted that, until recently, China’s advances in the maritime domain have been implemented incrementally, making it difficult for the United States and Japan to coordinate individual and combined efforts to respond proportionately and effectively to each successive incursion. China’s gray zone activities have included:

• Stepped-up deployment of heavily armored and armed coast guard vessels near and sometime passing into Japan’s territorial waters near Okinawa and the disputed Senkaku Islands.

• Increasing the use of their coast guard and navy vessels to approach Japan’s naval vessels and fishing boats.

• Intensifying their intelligence-gathering activities while transiting Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).

One of the most consequential issues confronting America’s regional strategic architecture in general and the U.S.-Japan security alliance in particular is China’s determination to pursue and implement its anti-access/aerial denial (A2/AD) strategy. While China has been steadily building and incrementally deploying the necessary technological and weapons systems to effectively implement A2/AD, the response by the United States and Japan has been uneven. Consequently, both feel a growing sense of urgency to create more coherent short-, medium-, and long-term joint strategies, plans, operations and improved coordination mechanisms to facilitate the implementation of responses from the lowest to the highest levels.

Conference participants agreed that the PRC’s gray zone activities coupled with its ongoing series of low-intensity provocations pose very serious challenges to the strategic interests of the United States, Japan, their alliance, and to the strategic political, economic, and security interests of their allies and partners throughout Asia and around the world. It is imperative that the United States and Japan pursue better security cooperation arrangements that allow for more active and more effective countermeasures.

Participants noted that in 2013, the United States and Japan had set joint strategic objectives aimed at deterring provocations from North Korea. They felt that the next iteration of joint strategic planning should include measures that also focus on deterring low-, medium- and high-intensity provocations by the PRC. To improve the effectiveness of the alliance responses in the near term, conference participants voiced strong support for immediately enhancing combined defense capabilities in Okinawa and in Japan’s southwestern islands, areas that are vital to the strategic interests of both the United States and Japan.

North Korea’s acquisition and use of nuclear weapons

Participants expressed serious concern about the DPRK’s testing and development of deliverable nuclear warheads and the steady production of both plutonium and highly enriched uranium in support of that program. Participants also pointed to the testing and development of ballistic missile technology, with the capability of reaching targets in the ROK, Japan, and the Western Pacific. Acknowledging the erratic nature of the Kim Jong Un regime and Beijing’s limited influence over his belligerent activities, workshop participants underscored the importance of developing more effective responses to North Korean provocations at all levels, including the integration of missile defense systems in the region. Participants emphasized the need to reassure U.S. allies about the viability of extended deterrence guarantees.

North Korea’s continued development and testing of its nuclear weapons capabilities is seen by both the United States and Japan as one of the greatest threats to them and to their strategic assets in Asia. It is equally important to note that the DPRK nuclear weapons programs also pose a significant challenge for
China, whose alliance with and influence over Pyongyang and Kim Jung Un appear to be on the decline. Conference participants pointed out that the PRC’s official stance in opposition to the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has often left China in the awkward position of issuing “stern responses” to North Korea’s nuclear tests, while also emphatically denying that they received any prior warning of the test from their only treaty ally. Despite China’s stated opposition to the DPRK’s latest nuclear and missile tests (September 2016) and its support for United Nations sanctions, Chinese willingness to strictly enforce such sanctions remains less than clear. The PRC’s diminished influence over deterring the DPRK’s provocative actions, coupled with its limited appetite for working with international organizations such as the United Nations or with regional actors to discourage North Korean development of a nuclear arsenal, greatly concerned conference participants.

Conference participants emphasized the need for the United States and Japan to explore ways to work more closely with South Korea on deterrence (including missile defense) and on creating trilateral security mechanisms aimed at preventing a low- or medium-level crisis from escalating into a full-blown conflict. As part of America’s pivot to Asia, Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) were initiated between the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to facilitate discussion of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and other regional security concerns. Participants noted that an expanded, institutionalized version of the DTT that features regular, ongoing U.S.-ROK-Japan dialogue focused on strategic security coordination issues could both enhance defense cooperation between the three countries and could also more effectively address the growing threat from North Korea’s heightened nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. Due to long-standing unresolved issues between Japan and South Korea, participants felt that a dialogue of this nature will only be effective—and is clearly only possible—if the United States acts as both the leader and the intermediary.

Participants also urged utilizing trilateral talks as the forum for regular discussions aimed at improving crisis management plans in response to incidents on the Korean Peninsula, for helping South Korea to seek potential pathways for Korean unification, and for exploring the likely implications of Korean unification for American, Japanese, and Korean relations with China, as well as with each other.

Cybersecurity, the future of Taiwan, and the role of Russia

In addition to the issues areas detailed above, participants also briefly noted the ongoing cybersecurity threats emanating from China, North Korea, and Russia; PRC-Taiwan relations; and Russia’s ambitions in Central Asia and the Pacific (that may increasingly compete with China’s) as suggested topics for future dialogues covering important issues affecting U.S.-Japan security relations. Unable to explore these important issues in depth due to time constraints, participants noted these as topics that could perhaps be pursued in subsequent side meetings or targeted for analysis in future workshops.
United States Marine Corps Sgt. Shou Oikawa (middle) translates for 1st Lt. Anthony Grandprey and his Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), Western Army Infantry Regiment, counterpart during a walkthrough of a live-fire range during Exercise Iron Fist 2016 on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif., Jan. 25. Iron Fist is an annual, bilateral amphibious training event between U.S. Marines and JGSDF soldiers designed to improve our ability to operate and communicate at the platoon, company and battalion levels.

Credit: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Timothy Valero/Flickr user U.S. Pacific Fleet, under a Creative Commons license.
The recent changes in Japan’s defense legislation and the reinterpretation of Article 9 of Japan’s post-World War II Constitution will, in theory, allow for a significant expansion of the potential and scope of U.S.-Japan combined security operations. However, participants agreed that there is a significant gap between the expectations with regard to what options might currently be possible and the reality of what can or should actually be done to improve the breadth and scope of U.S.-Japan mutual security and cooperation operations and capabilities in the short- and long-term. The conference dialogue in the second session explored ways to increase Japan’s evolving role within the existing structure of the security partnership. In particular, participants discussed ways to enhance Japan’s involvement in supporting the alliance mission through more active engagement in strategic planning, joint operations, contingency planning, and U.S. military base realignment efforts.

Participants described what they saw to be the most pressing concerns facing the revision of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and also provided recommendations for altering the SDF force structure and improving force integration and interoperability with their American military counterparts. Participants viewed the recent shift in Japan’s defense policy as an opportunity to update the alliance’s coordinating mechanisms with the goal of improving the implementation of combined strategy, plans, and training operations.

Protecting Japan-based American assets in times of crisis
While contingencies had been drawn up to address the outbreak of small-scale conflicts or large-scale wars, participants noted the lack of comprehensive plans within the U.S.-Japan mutual security and cooperation arrangements for protecting U.S. personnel and assets in times of crisis or natural disasters. The inadequacy of current emergency plans became apparent in the aftermath of the Fukushima-Daiichi disaster in 2011.

Immediately following the devastating Fukushima-Daiichi event, the U.S. military (led by U.S. Forces Japan) launched Operation Tomodachi, a disaster relief and humanitarian aid mission that swiftly provided assistance to the people and areas affected by the massive earthquake in Fukushima prefecture and the subsequent tsunami and local nuclear plant meltdown. The U.S. military (like the Japanese government) was able to respond as well and as quickly as it did because it had in place “all hazards” crisis mitigation plans that it could implement and adapt to meet the needs provoked by a large-scale natural disaster. However, while Operation Tomodachi allowed for the quick mobilization of U.S. resources,
it revealed that America’s security-oriented capabilities had some shortcomings when utilized to coordinate disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations in conjunction with the efforts also being implemented by the Government of Japan.

While the United States Forces Japan was able to mobilize quickly to support Japan's disaster relief measures, workshop participants stated that Japan did not have adequate reciprocal plans for protecting U.S. personnel and assets based in Japan. In addition, they noted that Japan also did not have in place the organizational capacity within its own disaster relief institutions to respond swiftly and effectively to address the potential needs of Americans in the event of a natural disaster or other unanticipated crisis. Conference participants strongly agreed that, in conjunction with improving current arrangements, the United States and Japan should initiate as soon as possible a process that targets the joint development of mutual assistance and resource development plans in the event of crises that predominantly impact U.S. assets based in Japan.

**Joint strategic assessments and planning**

Participants felt that, as the mutual security interests of the United States and Japan are becoming more closely linked to regional foreign policy concerns, greater bilateral efforts are required for creating and implementing more effective combined strategic and operational plans. The United States and Japan should focus on how best to align their respective national security interests with the alliance’s need for an overarching strategy that encompasses regionally oriented security cooperation measures and a bilateral coordination mechanism that facilitates the execution of joint training and operations.

Within the alliance structure, the United States provides the strategic nuclear deterrence backed by an impressive array of land-, sea-, and air-based offensive capabilities. For its part, Japan has traditionally fielded the troops and resources required to defend the homeland, airspace, and territorial waters, and has also supplied logistical and force protection support for their American partners. While the effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan security alliance has improved greatly over the past decade, participants stated that important revisions are now required to remove ambiguities from the strategy itself and from the implementation guidelines. In addition, gaps in coordination that currently undercut the effectiveness of alliance strategy need to be filled.

As previously stated, the recent changes in Japan’s security legislation have created expectations that exceed Japan’s current operational capacity. Given this misalignment in perceptions by military planners on both sides, conference members agreed that the United States and Japan must work more closely to assess existing capacity and capabilities. Revamping alliance strategy and revising existing plans and organizational structures must realistically address capacity and capability constraints in order to improve the coordination and implementation of existing plans for combined training or operational assignments. Upgrades to American and Japanese military capabilities are necessary and will likely need to be completed incrementally through capacity-building measures.

Participants stated that American and Japanese recognition of the gaps in their joint efforts led to the creation of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM), a flexible response system that allows the United States and Japan to coordinate their joint responses to low-, medium-, or high-level crises. While the ACM is a welcome innovation to the alliance structure, participants viewed it as a “work in progress” that would require ongoing revisions to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their cooperative efforts.

The new Joint Defense Guidelines adopted in the spring of 2015 remain focused on the defense of Japan but the ACM provides a means of creating flexible responses to a variety of crises, including regional security problems. This mechanism will include a new Bilateral
Planning Mechanism to help increase the efficacy of joint contingency plans and operations as well as the effectiveness of bilateral training exercises.

In terms of improving outcomes at the operational level, the ACM’s pivotal role in enabling the execution of timely and effective joint relief efforts by both governments in the wake of the April 2016 earthquakes in Kumamoto demonstrates the importance of such an institution for facilitating cooperation in times of natural disasters and other non-security crises. ACM was designed to be adjustable and to allow for dialing up responses to meet the needs of a particular crisis. Standard operating procedures are quickly being developed and refined as U.S. and Japan responders learn more with each successive event.

What appears to be missing, though, is an overarching policy that helps determine how best to implement the details. The United States and Japan must work closely to revise their strategy and to restructure the bilateral coordination mechanism that informs both the joint planning and the implementation of training and operations. In short, a policy strategy needs to be established and response guidelines for implementation need greater clarification with regard to the personnel and resources required for executing effective responses to military versus humanitarian crises. The ACM will continue to evolve and improve in response to after-action reviews of crises and disasters. In addition, participants also suggested that attention also be paid to testing the ACM in scenarios and exercises to provide American and Japanese planners with the means to proactively revise and update the coordination mechanisms prior to a crisis, as opposed to only revamping ACM in the wake of response failures in a prior event.

Asset management options in times of crisis were also noted as topics of concern. Participants felt that management options within the alliance structure remain ambiguous because both sides lack a clear understanding of the assets available for crisis response.

Unfortunately, the adjustment of Japan’s defense policies has, in some ways, exacerbated this problem. For example, under Japan’s new security legislation, there is a lack of clarity as to which SDF or law enforcement units can be utilized and the circumstances under which either or both can be activated to enforce alliance objectives. Without a clear understanding of the availability and responsibilities of mutual assets, the development of effective combined strategy, plans, and operations becomes problematic.

Conference participants underscored the need for the United States and Japan to focus on compiling a comprehensive survey of their assets, clarifying the conditions under which these assets are available, and developing sound strategies and operational plans for jointly deploying these assets to meet the growing challenges in their quickly evolving security environment. Once these plans are in place, test scenarios and joint training exercises should be undertaken on a regular basis to hone and sharpen the operational and tactical skills of those charged with implementing the strategic crisis response plans. Participants also advised that greater investments be made in equipment and infrastructure that better integrates—or, at the very least, links—U.S. Pacific Command with the Japan Self-Defense Forces and to the supporting law enforcement units assigned to joint operational or response missions.

Finally, while Japan’s new security mandate has increased the possibilities for capacity building, participants acknowledged that it will take time for Japan to adapt its defense bureaucracy, its industrial infrastructure, and its military force structure to meet the growing expectations for enhancing Japan’s role in implementing the alliance’s mutual security and cooperation policies. Not to be overlooked, it will also take time and bilateral efforts to convince the Japanese public that these changes are needed to enhance the effectiveness of the alliance and are therefore also in Japan’s best interest. As such, despite the wide array of possibilities inspired by Japan’s new defense legislation and in spite of what lead-
ers in both countries consider to be urgent, the need to expand Japan’s responsibilities within the alliance and increase Japan’s defense capacity is likely to move forward at an incremental pace, at least in the near term. With that in mind, participants encouraged both governments to use this adjustment time to work closely to revise the alliance’s strategy, operations, and training plans in a manner that not only addresses current security concerns, but also takes into account the very real constraints that this security partnership faces with respect to available assets, bilateral response coordination, and public support.

Southwest Japan and Okinawa
Participants felt that the geographic areas of particular concern for the U.S.-Japan security alliance were the Senkaku Islands and Okinawa. Japanese control over the Senkakus is actively contested by China, which disputes Japan’s sovereignty claims. While not taking a position on the issue of sovereignty, the United States has made it clear that the security treaty guarantees extend to that territory. Yet a clear set of options with regard to the wide array of “gray zone” escalations—including intended or unintended events between the armed forces of Japan and the PRC—remain unclear, participants felt. To prepare for any incidents that may occur in the near future, participants urged the United States and Japan to develop and implement comprehensive counter-provocation plans as well as specific ACM measures both for defending the Senkakus and for responding to all levels of crises that might arise due to the ongoing dispute with China. In addition, participants recommended that the organizational mandates for Japan’s Coast Guard be restructured to allow for better coordination with the United States in defending the Senkakus.

The strategic importance of Okinawa to the U.S.-Japan security alliance cannot be overstated. Participants did not engage in an extended discussion of American base issues on Okinawa, but there was general agreement that the failure to resolve base realignment and relocation problems remains a deeply troubling issue for the alliance. Some American participants suggested that the upcoming change in administration in the United States offered a moment to reassess the structure of U.S. forces on Okinawa, and in Japan more broadly, with the aim of perhaps reducing the American military presence on Okinawa. However, Japanese participants were extremely reluctant to reopen the deeper issue of base structure, given the sensitive political situation in Okinawa and the opposition to the relocation of the Futenma Marine Air Station. While no consensus was reached on that point, all agreed that the base relocation issue needs to be resolved soon as the current ambiguity makes it difficult for the alliance to develop and implement long-term strategy and operations plans for U.S.-Japan mutual security and cooperation efforts in this strategically sensitive location.

Regional partnerships and the U.S.-Japan alliance
Conference participants agreed that, especially in the short- to medium-term, “bilateral+” mechanisms for addressing regional security concerns were likely to more effective in discouraging provocations and encouraging deterrence. Participants generally supported the development of “bilateral+” measures similar to the DTT (with the Republic of Korea), noting that the recently signed trilateral agreements with the Philippines and with Australia provide good examples of the most promising path to advancing regional security in the near-term. These additional and complementary security agreements serve to enhance security cooperation throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, providing important pathways for maintaining peace and stability while also providing a more robust deterrence against unilateral provocations that could potentially escalate into war. Participants urged the United States and Japan to continue these “bilateral+” security cooperation arrangements that not only help to improve American and Japanese relations with states throughout Asia, but also
give the alliance the time and space they need to regroup and adjust as Japan transitions onto a more flexible strategic footing.

In terms of discouraging the PRC’s ongoing aggressive pursuit of its maritime claims in the Western Pacific, participants saw India (with its own unresolved territorial disputes with China) and Australia as the states with the best “bilateral+” partnering potential for the alliance. In South Asia, participants noted that measurable progress had already been made by the United States and Japan, both of whom had already intensified their official talks and interactions with India. Regarding tensions in the South China Sea, the United States has been working diligently to strengthen its existing security ties with Australia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Participants suggested that the United States and Japan consider the possibility of a robust “bilateral+” security cooperation partnership with Australia, with the United States taking the lead in initiating exploratory discussions between Japan and Australia to move beyond dialogue and towards the consideration of developing combined plans and operational measures. These “bilateral+” security arrangements appear to be a promising way forward for the United States and Japan to augment their joint capabilities and capacity without necessarily also increasing the size of their military footprint in the specific areas of concern or in the region.

Participants noted the importance of America’s and Japan’s Defense Trilateral Talks with South Korea, stating how it could provide a possible template for exploring ways to draw support from other regional allies, such as India and Australia. The DTT, a pivotal security cooperation and coordination mechanism, is a work in progress with the United States playing the crucial role of leading discussions, facilitating informational exchange, and moderating reactions at all levels between Japan and Korea. Ultimately, keeping this security dialogue at a high profile will help ensure its effectiveness in maintaining deterrence especially in Northeast Asia, but also throughout the entire region.
Service members with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force pull Combat Rubber Raiding Craft into the water at Kin Blue, Okinawa, Japan, March 1, 2016. The JGSDF members observed Marines from 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force, practice scout swimmer techniques and conduct raid missions. The JGSDF members are with the 43rd Infantry Regiment.

Credit: U.S. Marine photo by Cpl. Robert Williams Jr./Flickr user U.S. Pacific Fleet, under a Creative Commons license
Deepening defense cooperation between the United States and Japan must build on a solid foundation of effective military capabilities coupled with comprehensive interoperability and seamless coordination between the armed forces of both countries. The third session sought to analyze this broad issue more concretely by examining the systems of weapons development and procurement, including cooperation between the United States and Japan in developing and marketing of weapons systems that combine technological innovations from both states. Participants agreed that the October 2015 launch of the Ministry of Defense’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA)—which coordinates and rationalizes logistics, establishes plausible procurement procedures, and eases restrictions on defense exports—was an important and positive innovation that offers new opportunities for cooperation.

Turning to an analysis of the ability of the United States and Japan to effectively implement changes to the alliance strategy and operations plans, participants reviewed a brief history of U.S.-Japan mutual security cooperation measures. Participants subsequently assessed the expectations stimulated by the revisions to Japan’s defense legislation and the reinterpretation of Article 9. The conversation focused on an analysis of several weapons procurement and asset management cases that highlighted the gap in perception that exists between the hopes of defense policy planners and the actual status of Japan’s current weapons development and production capacity, as well as the combined operational and tactical capabilities of its military and supporting law enforcement agencies.

Participants felt that the shift in Japan’s military posture will, in the longer term, undoubtedly spur an increase in capacity-building measures that will strengthen and improve security cooperation programs. Over the course of the discussions, it became apparent to conference members that, in the short term, there was a pressing need for the United States and Japan to prioritize the creation of a renewed bilateral security dialogue that focuses on updating the mission objectives, restructuring the existing combined doctrine, and revising the current operational plans. Through a comprehensive reassessment of capabilities and capacity at all levels, participants advised that this bilateral dialogue should aim to augment the coordination and integration of U.S.-Japan security cooperation activities through improved training, logistics, and systems interoperability measures. The objective of this bilateral dialogue should be the establishment of a mutually beneficial security strategy that links directly with existing operational plans and security cooperation endeavors in a manner that coincides
with the respective security capabilities of each state.

But Japan faces serious resource and budgetary restraints that will limit both the pace and scope of any defense restructuring and buildup in the near term. This limitation should encourage both governments to coordinate efforts to build mechanisms that improve cooperation and integration of weapons development, production, and procurement endeavors as a means to cut costs and increase efficiency.

Capacity building in Japan: Bureaucratic, structural, and institutional obstacles

Japan’s revised security legislation has unlocked opportunities for capacity-building measures that would eventually allow Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to take on greater responsibilities within the alliance structure. But while many of the post-World War II legal hurdles for augmenting Japan’s military capabilities have been cleared, other long-standing bureaucratic, structural, and institutional obstacles remain. These will undoubtedly slow the pace of revising Japan’s military doctrine, modernizing its force structure, as well as expanding its weapons development, production, procurement, and export capacity. While touched on only briefly during this conference, participants also noted as significant Japan’s anemic public support for the recent changes to its postwar military doctrine. The alliance partners will ultimately need to address this important issue together and directly.

Both within the Government of Japan and in its relations with other countries, there are overlapping lines of responsibility for defense policy decision-making, with the prime minister, foreign minister, and the defense minister all playing leading roles. This redundancy of responsibilities is, in part, due to the Defense Ministry’s only very recent elevation to a cabinet-level ministry (in 2007). Regardless of the source, in order to smooth the way for the reorientation of Japan’s posture and for subsequently building the capacity of its armed forces, participants suggested that a single ministry (and minister) be designated to take the lead both within Japan and when negotiating new or revised defense agreements and security cooperation measures. Within Japan itself, there needs to be greater clarity in defining the designated minister’s mandate as well as the role he would be playing in revising Japan’s domestic defense policies and international security programs. In addition, coordinating mechanisms need to be established within the Government of Japan to facilitate communications and activities between the various ministries on all defense-related programs.

An important structural complication for capacity building in Japan is the limited development of its defense industries, especially when compared with that of the United States. Due to decades of legal restrictions on military industrial programs, Japan has a surprisingly low capacity for defense research, development, production, acquisition programs and for the export of domestically produced military systems. Instead, the framework of Japan’s postwar research, technology, and industrial foundation was intentionally geared towards economic expansion and structured to accommodate the production of consumer goods for high-volume exports. It will take time to create—or spin off—from the current industrial climate a business culture, industrial base, and a production capacity that internalizes the stricter informational parameters required of an effective defense industry sector. In the interim, the existing gap already contributes to capacity-building shortfalls and will continue to slow the pace for increasing Japan’s portfolio of responsibilities within the U.S.-Japan alliance framework.

Japan’s industrial orientation towards high-volume, consumer-driven manufacturing and exports—while promoting economic competition and growth as well as innovative consumer products and services—does not necessarily facilitate the development or production of weapons systems, whether for domestic use or for export. Despite new legislation on the protection of secrets, the information security
of highly sensitive weapons systems remains a delicate issue between the United States and Japan, particularly with regard to joint weapons acquisition and development programs. Given the integral nature that cutting-edge technology plays in modern weaponry, workshop participants pointed to the lack of alignment on this critical, but sensitive area as a crucial stumbling block.

Overcoming U.S. sensitivity for sharing with Japan access to critical American technologies that are needed to develop the joint platforms required for interoperability will be a slow, meticulous, and very guarded process. Conference participants felt strongly that finding a way to resolve this issue will be vital for hastening the pace at which the expansion of important aspects of Japan’s defense capabilities can be achieved. However, participants noted an awareness by both countries that “alliance strengthening” alone fails to provide sufficient justification for easing this impasse. Japan and the United States will need to find ways to agree on additional offset inducements as well as information security and reassurance measures that mutually benefit their respective domestic business partners and begin to eliminate lingering reservations toward information sharing.

Participants felt that the establishment of top-tier bilateral cybersecurity and information protection mechanisms that both enhance and safeguard joint security cooperation could provide the best way forward. This can only be achieved through intense bilateral dialogue that focuses on the issues surrounding sensitive technologies and seeks to develop best practices that would benefit both states. Learning lessons from past efforts at joint weapons development or acquisition (e.g., FS-X fighter, SM-3 missiles, etc.) could provide good insight into promising ways for resolving the complexity of these types of issues. Participants also suggested that American and Japanese planners examine other joint development or acquisition cases with the United States (e.g., U.S.-Germany joint production of a short range missile system; U.S.-U.K. air-to-air missile program, etc.) for guidelines that could potentially be applied to Japan’s current transitional needs and to the requirements for improving the capabilities of the alliance.

Political-military alignment and capacity building

Participants reiterated the need for the United States and Japan to intensify and deepen their respective efforts to achieve political-military alignment at all levels, even in those sectors that include dual-use or other types of highly sensitive technologies. They also highlighted several existing and proposed mechanisms that could potentially help resolve the issues hindering capacity-building efforts. As an example, participants pointed to Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which help inform SDF strategy as well as the policies governing strategy implementation, force structure, and force posture. They noted that the NDPG are already making headway in developing long-term plans for reorienting domestic and international security policies. Conference members suggested that it would be ideal to establish at this time a mechanism that would allow the United States to engage closely with Japan (perhaps via the NDPG) at the planning stage on proposed changes for programs that directly affect mutual security and cooperation endeavors.

As previously mentioned, Japan recently launched the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency to consolidate the management and administration of its defense research and development, procurement, and promote exports. ATLA was established to assist with filling in the gaps between Japan’s current industrial capabilities, the needs of Japan’s servicemen, and the institutional requirements of the SDF. Workshop participants stated that while ATLA represents a good start at rationalizing the revision, expansion, and control of Japan’s defense industries, additional reforms will be required to facilitate the creation of programs that augment joint development and production with the United States in support of the
alliance. Suggested changes include revamping the agency’s mandate to also focus on future technological assessments, to promote acquisition reforms, and to help Japan’s defense policymakers and defense industry leaders improve their knowledge of the restrictions and requirements demanded by the United States for access to its weapons systems and to satisfy its parameters for export controls. Participants recommended the creation of a U.S.-Japan Joint Program Office, perhaps attached to ATL A, to address issues of mutual concern.
Conference participants agreed that much needed to be done to improve the U.S.-Japan security alliance’s response to the evolving threats in the region in both the short- and long-term and to preserve the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Participants agreed that the top two security concerns confronting the U.S.-Japan security alliance are North Korea’s ambitions to expand their nuclear arsenal and increase their ballistic missile capabilities and China’s determination to assert control over the South China and East China Seas.

While sharing concern about China’s assertiveness, participants felt that the United States and Japan should also find ways to engage with China on missions such as peacekeeping or humanitarian operations that often require military-to-military cooperation, as these are seen as positive ways to improve both communications and overall relations between these three countries. Participants also advised both the American and Japanese governments to try to deepen their understanding of the issues threatening the domestic stability of the PRC and the DPRK. Participants stated that internal turmoil and uncertainty appear to contribute (at least in part) both to China’s and to North Korea’s ongoing regional security provocations—the very issues causing the greatest concern for the United States and Japan.

Workshop participants concluded that the U.S.-Japan security alliance could not effectively counter on its own the burgeoning array of Indo-Asia-Pacific regional security issues. They felt that a “bilateral+” approach that explored the potential of more (and more extensive) security cooperation partnerships with other states in Asia offered the best path forward for maintaining peace and stability throughout the region. Such partnerships, they argued, should include security arrangements that augment both military capabilities and capacity building measures wherever necessary.

The workshop participants shared a perception that while the way forward would require much work, many of the necessary revisions to increase the effectiveness of the alliance’s strategies, plans, and operations were already well underway. To increase the effectiveness of alliance strategy and plans, participants advised that priority be placed on using the newly created Alliance Coordination Mechanism (and other similar structures for joint planning that move beyond broad commitments to coordination) to develop more concrete avenues of interoperability. There is a clear awareness that with Japan’s revised security legislation, the two allies are now able to engage in the kind of joint contingency planning that had always been difficult to carry out in the past due to legal and political restrictions. However, par-
participants also recognized that revamping the alliance structure, plans, and operations will proceed slowly and that patience is required on both sides as this transition gets underway.

Finally, while there was only enough time to touch very briefly on the role of public opinion in Japan toward its new defense legislation, participants acknowledged that it remains difficult to overcome over six decades of postwar tradition that originally mandated that Japan only field military forces whose sole mission is the defense of Japan. Even in the face of the rising challenge from China and the escalating threats from North Korea, and even after extensive debate in the parliament on the new defense legislation, the majority of Japanese citizens have yet to embrace the broad changes in Japan’s security policy. The deployment and use of Japanese armed forces beyond the defense of Japan itself continues to be seen as overly ambitious by most Japanese. In addition, the competing demands on Japan’s budgetary resources under the conditions of slow economic growth and an aging society clearly limit Japan’s defense capacity. American policymakers must temper their expectations regarding Japan’s greater security role in the region and keep in mind a clear understanding of the realities constraining Japan’s ability to transition more quickly to both accepting and implementing a new military doctrine.

Policymakers should keep in mind that the perspective of experts and practitioners is typically quite different from that of ordinary citizens. Education, exchange, and outreach efforts that improve public awareness of the important role that Japan, in partnership with the United States, plays in maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and in deterring provocations against Japan and the United States is seen as a promising way to increase appreciation and understanding of the importance of the alliance overall.

With the shift in Japan’s defense policies, there is now a great opportunity to strengthen the alliance and increase its effectiveness and influence. While recognizing that there is still much work ahead, participants concluded the conference with increased confidence in the ability of the American and Japanese governments to engage with renewed energy and focus to ensure the continued success of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, now and well into the future.

The opening dialogue featured an exploration of American and Japanese perspectives on what each considered to be the most significant security challenges in the region. Conference participants also analyzed the efficacy of joint responses by the United States and Japan to these challenges and the adequacy of their current security arrangements. Participants closed this session with a discussion that explored ways to strengthen the alliance and improve its ability to respond effectively—in the short- and long-term—to rising regional tensions and to provocations and crises at all levels of intensity.

In the second session, participants analyzed the implications of Japan’s recent updates to its security legislation for the future of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Participants candidly assessed the current status of the American and Japanese individual and joint operational capabilities, the possibilities for augmenting Japan’s role with the alliance structure, as well as what would be required of both the United States and Japan to improve both the effectiveness and efficiency of their joint strategic and operational planning and capabilities in the future.

The conference concluded with a candid evaluation of the possibilities and obstacles for operationalizing the new national security legislation to build the capacity of Japan’s domestic political, military, and defense industry capabilities. In the final session, through the lens of Japan’s current weapons development and procurement programs, participants investigated the barriers to capacity building that Japan faces as it tries to transition away from the post-World War II institutions that restricted the expansion of its military capabilities. Attendees looked to learn lessons from the past to inform future plans for augmenting Japan’s future capabilities in weapons development, production, acquisition, sales, and deployment.

Throughout the workshop, participants were asked for their views about what they saw to be the greatest challenges facing the U.S.-Japan security alliance and if they felt that the alliance was well positioned to upgrade the mutual security cooperation arrangements and improve the effectiveness of this long-standing partnership. Experts from both sides presented analytical assessments of the issues and challenges facing the United States and Japan and provided informed, insightful proposals for resolving them. Participants agreed that strengthening the alliance would require better coordinated bilateral strategic planning in the future. Participants all noted an increasingly assertive China and an unpredictable North Korea as posing two of the most pressing challenges to the security interests of Japan and the United States.

We provide here a description of the workshop logistics to facilitate an understanding of the dynamics of each session. Remarks made to open each session of the conference were solely for the purpose of focusing and encouraging discussion and dialogue. As such, no part of the summary information presented in this report is attributable any of the moderators, session presenters, or discussion facilitators whose names are provided in the workshop agenda below.
PHOTO: Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Halsey (DDG 97) on patrol in the South China Sea in 2014 in the 7th Fleet area of operations in support of stability and security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
CREDIT: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman David Flewellyn/Flickr user U.S. Pacific Fleet, under a Creative Commons license
THE INAUGURAL U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY WORKSHOP
JAPAN’S EVOLVING DEFENSE POLICY & U.S.-JAPAN
SECURITY COOPERATION:
EXPECTATIONS VERSUS REALITY
19 MAY 2016
INTERNATIONAL HOUSE OF JAPAN
MINATO-KU, TOKYO

AGENDA

0845–0900 WELCOMING REMARKS
U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry  Director, U.S.-Asia Security Initiative,
Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University
Japan Dr. Sahashi Ryo  Research Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange

0900–1030 SESSION I
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE ASSESSMENTS OF SECURITY TRENDS IN EAST ASIA
U.S. Christopher Twomey  Naval Postgraduate School
Japan Satake Tomohiko  National Institute for Defense Studies

Examination of the current security situation in East Asia and its implication for the United States, for
Japan, and for the security alliance. What are the most significant security challenges in the region?
How have the U.S. and regional actors responded? Are those responses adequate to the challenge?

1045–1215 SESSION II
JAPAN’S NEW NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS,
TRAINING, AND STRATEGIC PLANNING
U.S. James Schoff  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Japan Vice Admiral Koda Yoji  Vice Admiral (ret.), Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces
Former Advisor to Japan’s National Security Secretariat

What do the recent changes in Japan’s defense legislation, the reinterpretation of the constitution re-
garding collective defense, the growth in defense spending, and the growing engagement in security
cooperation across the Indo-Pacific region mean for the U.S.-Japan security alliance? What is the cur-
rent role of joint training and combined exercises with other countries in the region? What are the impli-
cations for U.S.-Japan combined operations and contingency planning? For shared strategic planning?
How are Japanese defense planners changing their thinking? Are American expectations in line with
Japanese realities and vice-versa? Should we rethink U.S. base structure in Japan? Base challenges in
Okinawa? Status of Forces and host nation support issues?

1215–1400 LUNCH
Keynote Takamizawa Nobushige  Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary,
Office of the Prime Minister of Japan
SESSION III
JAPAN'S NEW NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE
COOPERATION & WEAPONS ACQUISITION

U.S. Gregg Rubinstein GAR Associates
Japan Sato Heigo Takushoku University

What is the direction of Japanese defense policy regarding weapons development and procurement? How have U.S.-Japan defense programs evolved since the Cold War era? Is Japan reassessing its mix of systems, their deployment, relative weight of air and naval versus ground forces, and standardization of systems to encourage greater coordination with the United States? What are the obstacles to closer cooperation? What do the changes in Japan’s defense logistics and procurement system mean for the alliance?

CONFERENCE SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS

MEETINGS AND BRIEFINGS FOR U.S. PARTICIPANTS
20 MAY 2016

0900–1000 CLOSED BRIEFING SESSION
Representative of U.S. Forces Japan
Conference Room D, International House of Japan

1000–1115 GROUP DISCUSSION

1200–1330 LUNCH FOR U.S. PARTICIPANTS
Sakura Restaurant, International House of Japan

1200–1300 CONFERENCE ORGANIZERS’ MEETING
U.S. Ambassador Caroline Kennedy
Ambassador’s Residence, U.S. Embassy Tokyo

1430–1530 MEETING
Deputy Chief of Mission Jason Hyland & The Japan Country Team
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo

1545–1645 MEETING
Tanaka Hitoshi Chairman, Institute for International Strategy, Japan Research Institute; Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange; former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Advisor to Former Prime Minister Koizumi
Mr. Tanaka’s Private Office

1715–1800 MEETING
Ishiba Shigeru Minister of State for the National Strategic Special Zones; Minister in Charge Overcoming Population Decline and Revitalizing Local Economy in Japan; former Minister of Defense and former Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries
Mr. Ishiba’s Office in the Diet
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